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THE JUDGE AS LINGUIST
Peter Meges Tiersma*
I. INTRODUCTION
Language is a quintessential human characteristic. Absent develop-
mental deprivation or disability, every human being can speak and un-
derstand at least one language. Without language it is impossible to
conceive of the building of pyramids, the development of science, or the
creation of states. Law is also made possible by language. In contrast to
custom, which can often be transmitted simply by observing the adher-
ence of a community to an unspoken norm, law virtually by definition is
articulated in speech or writing. Words may describe habit or custom,
but they constitute the law. Thus, for the legal profession and particu-
larly for judges, language is not merely a means of communication, but
an object of analysis.
Perhaps it is because language and law are so intimately intertwined
that judges and lawyers have only recently begun to consider that rela-
tionship in any detail.1 Furthermore, linguistics-the scientific study of
language-is a relatively young discipline that in many ways did not
come into its own until the latter half of this century.2 Still, the fact that
judges and linguists frequently engage in the same professional activity-
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; J.D., Boalt Hall, 1986;
Ph.D., University of California, San Diego, 1980.
I thank Lawrence Solan for comments on an earlier draft. The title of this Essay turned
out to be the same as a chapter in his book, The Language of Judges. While I did not con-
sciously expropriate it, I may have subconsciously remembered it from reading his book. Un-
fortunately, I can think of no better title.
1. One clear exception to this is Professor Mellinkoff's exhaustive and highly illuminat-
ing study of the language of the legal profession. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF
THE LAW (1963). Of course, some lawyers have long been concerned with simplifying legal
language. Perhaps the best example is provided by Richard C. Wydick. See, e.g., RICHARD C.
WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (2d ed. 1985); Richard C. Wydick, Plain English for
Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 727 (1978).
It is not the purpose of this Essay to review the growing field of language and law. For
some general overviews of the research, see Brenda Danet, Language in the Legal Process, 14
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 445 (1980); Judith N. Levi, The Study of Language in the Judicial Process,
in LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 3 (Judith N. Levi & Anne G. Walker eds., 1990);
William O'Barr, The Language of the Law, in LANGUAGE IN THE U.S.A. 386 (Charles A.
Ferguson & Shirley B. Heath eds., 1981); and Peter M. Tiersma, Linguistic Issues in the Law,
69 LANGUAGE 113 (1993).
2. See FREDERICK J. NEWMEYER, LINGUISTIC THEORY IN AMERICA: THE FIRST
QUARTER-CENTURY OF TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE GRAMMAR 12 (1980).
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analyzing language-strongly suggests that each can learn from the
other. In this Essay I explore some of the situations in which judges are
called upon to analyze language, and what they might learn by applying
linguistic research to that task.
II. CRIMINAL LAW
There are several crimes that may be committed by means of lan-
guage, or in which the words of the accused play a critical role. These
include bribery, conspiracy, perjury, threat, and solicitation. In many
such cases, a judge or a jury must decide what an accused meant by
words that allegedly prove one of the elements of the crime.3
Often, in an investigation, the government covertly records an indi-
vidual's conversations and then, in levying charges, ascribes to them a
literalness that is not justified linguistically. Consider the following con-
versation from a case in which D, an organized crime figure, was accused
of conspiracy to murder X:
T: And then we killed that [X].
D: Yeah.4
Although the government argued that this exchange proved that D par-
ticipated in killing X, linguist Ellen Prince has pointed out that it is really
quite ambiguous.' For one thing, the word "yeah" does not necessarily
signal agreement. Sometimes it merely indicates that the hearer has
processed the preceding statement; by saying "yeah" or "right," the
hearer indicates to her interlocutor that he can continue. In other words,
by saying "yeah" D may simply have indicated to T that she understood
what T said and that T could continue. This is hardly an admission that
D participated in the murder.
A more important ambiguity occurs in the word "we." Linguists
distinguish between an inclusive and exclusive use of this pronoun; in
fact, some languages have separate pronouns for each. Inclusive "we"
refers to the speaker and the hearer ("We should stop meeting like this"),
3. For an extensive discussion of some of these linguistic crimes, see ROGER W. SHUY,
LANGUAGE CRIMES: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LANGUAGE EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1993). See also Georgia M. Green, Linguistic Analysis of Conversation as Evidence Regarding
the Interpretation of Speech Events, in LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at
247 (describing linguistic analysis of conversation that qualifies as proper subject of expert
testimony); Peter M. Tiersma, The Language of Perury: "Literal Truth, " Ambiguity and the
False Statement Requirement, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 373 (1990) (analyzing requirement of per-
jury law that defendant have made false statement).
4. Taken from Ellen F. Prince, On the Use of Social Conversation as Evidence in a Court
of Law, in LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 279, 283.
5. Id. at 284.
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while exclusive "we" refers to the speaker and a third party ("We hope
you'll come to our party tonight"). Thus, even if D is held to have
agreed with T's statement by saying "yeah," it is unclear what exactly
she agreed with because T's statement is ambiguous. It can be para-
phrased either as "then you and I killed X," or as "then I and someone
else killed X. 6
Unfortunately, judges have often been reluctant to admit linguistic
testimony on the meaning of conversations of this kind.7 Of course,
judges and juries can certainly understand ordinary conversation. But
they are not always conscious of the particular problems of analyzing
speech that have been covertly recorded by government informers. Dis-
cussions about murdering someone are not, one hopes, the sort of ordi-
nary conversation with which judges and juries are familiar. At least in
some situations, linguists can contribute to a better understanding of
what happened.
III. TORTS
Like crimes, torts may be committed by language. The most evident
example is defamation, which normally involves spoken or written com-
munication. As Geoffrey Pullum has pointed out, the law of defamation
is difficult to rationalize from a linguistic standpoint.8 While it is possible
to formulate a linguistic approach to defamatory language,9 it seems
likely that the arcane common-law rules of libel and slander will con-
tinue to hold sway for the foreseeable future.
Judges and juries may also have to analyze language in quite a dif-
ferent area of tort law: product liability. Specifically, many products
that have the potential to injure are reasonably safe if consumers use
them according to directions. In such cases, however, manufacturers
must adequately warn users how to avoid any potential risks.
Unfortunately, warnings are not always as linguistically effective as
they could be. A particularly good (or bad!) example is the label on a
bottle of rubbing alcohol that I recently purchased, which advises users:
6. See id. Additional ambiguity with the pronoun "we" is pointed out in SHUY, supra
note 3, at 46.
7. See Note, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Discourse Analysis of Recorded
Conversations, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 69 (1986).
8. Geoffrey K. Pullum, The Linguistics of Defamation, in THE GREAT ESKIMO VOCAB-
ULARY HOAX AND OTHER IRREVERENT ESSAYS ON THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE 92 (Geoffrey
K. Pullum ed., 1991).
9. See, ag., Peter M. Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 TEX. L. REv. 303 (1987)
(advocating view that defamatory language involves speech act of accusing).
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FOR EXTERNAL USE ONLY
Will produce serious gastric disturbances if taken internally
In case of accidental ingestion, seek professional assistance. 0
Would a person of little education, or a recently arrived immigrant with
limited English competence, understand this warning? Does "for exter-
nal use" mean that you should only drink it outside the house? What are
"gastric disturbances," and what does it mean that such disturbances will
result from "taking" the rubbing alcohol "internally"? For example,
does this mean that you will suffer gastric disturbances if you inject it
directly into a vein, but perhaps not if you drink it? And if a consumer
accidentally "ingests" it, and actually understands what that means,
should he go directly to a lawyer for "professional assistance"? Perhaps
SO.
Clearly, linguists and researchers in related fields could conduct ex-
periments regarding the degree of comprehension of warnings like the
above, and advise judges and juries regarding their effectiveness. I I Even
without sophisticated research, however, it is easy to understand that
something like the following would be far more effective than the present
warning:
DO NOT DRINK!
Rubbing alcohol is very different from the alcohol in beer,
wine, or hard liquor.
If you drink this, you may become very sick. Go to a doctor or
get other medical help immediately!
IV. CONTRACTS AND WILLS
Contracts, wills, and similar private agreements, such as those relat-
ing to partnership and agency, are interesting linguistically because they
are generally created by particular types of speech acts. For example,
contracts involve the speech acts of offer, acceptance, and promise.
Promise, in particular, has received a great deal of attention in the litera-
ture, both in general terms and in how it relates to the law of contracts.1 2
10. Taken from a label for Isopropyl Rubbing Alcohol distributed by Thrifty Drug and
Discount Stores.
11. See, e.g., Bethany K. Dumas, Adequacy of Cigarette Package Warnings: An Analysis of
the Adequacy of Federally Mandated Cigarette Package Warnings, in LANGUAGE IN THE JU-
DICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 309; Michael G. Johnson, Language and Cognition in Prod-
ucts Liability, in LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 291.
12. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Maarten Henket, Con-
tracts, Promises and Meaning: The Question of Intent, 2 INT'L J. FOR SEMIOTICS L. 129
(1989); R.A. Samek, Performative Utterances and the Concept of Contract, 43 AUSTRALASIAN
[Vol. 27:269
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In contracts and wills cases, a threshold issue often addressed by the
courts is whether a valid contract or will exists at all. Specifically in
contract law, critical distinctions exist between parties actually promising
something-potentially forming an enforceable contract-and parties
simply talking about promising-engaging in preliminary negotiations.
Likewise, in the law of wills an important issue is whether a testator is
actually giving away her property at death, and thus has testamentary
intent, or is simply talking about what she hopes or plans to give later.
Interestingly, J.L. Austin, the philosopher of language, observed that
promising and giving are performatives, where properly articulating a
particular speech act ("I promise" or "I give") actually performs the act
of creating obligation or transferring property.' 3 In other words, the use
of a performative is an important indicator that a speaker intends to
enter into a binding contract or a valid will. Again, judges and linguists
have similar concerns in this area and could learn from each other.
V. CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
A. Interpretation
Much of the work of judges and lawyers consists of determining the
meaning of constitutional and statutory language. While numerous
nonlinguistic factors come into play, logic and tradition-expressed to
some extent in the "plain meaning" rule-dictate that statutory or con-
stitutional interpretation at least begin with the text. Each time judges
try to determine what words mean, they are engaging in a type of linguis-
tic analysis by applying their innate knowledge of language to process
sequences of sounds or letters. Of course, all humans engage in such
linguistic activity virtually every day, simply by reading or hearing others
talk. What makes the work of judges much like that of professional lin-
guists, however, is that judges not only interpret statutes, but also at-
tempt to articulate rules that govern interpretation. Often the judicial
rules or canons of interpretation are quite similar to, and predate, linguis-
J. PHIL. 196 (1965); Sanford A. Schane, A Speech Act Analysis of Consideration in Contract
Law, in LANGUAGE AND LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE LINGUISTIC LAW 581 (Paul Pupier & Jose
Woehrling eds., 1989); Peter M. Tiersma, The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts
and the Question of Intent, 74 CAL. L. REV. 189 (1986); Peter M. Tiersma, Reassessing Unilat-
eral Contracts: The Role of Offer, Acceptance and Promise, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1992).
13. J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962). On legal speech acts gener-
ally, see DENNIS KURZON, IT IS HEREBY PERFORMED... EXPLORATIONS IN LEGAL SPEECH
ACTS (1986).
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tic principles that attempt to describe how speakers understand ordinary
conversation.
14
Unfortunately, some decisions by judges reflect a distinct lack of lin-
guistic sophistication. Lawrence Solan discusses one such example in his
recent book, The Language of Judges.1 5 In California v. Brown, 6 the
trial court sentenced the defendant to death for murder. In the penalty
phase of the trial, the judge instructed the jury not to be swayed by
"mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opin-
ion or public feeling." 17 Brown was sentenced to death. He later argued
that his death penalty proceeding violated the Eighth Amendment be-
cause the instruction limited his constitutional right to appeal to any
sympathetic factors raised by the evidence.'" The United States Supreme
Court, however, upheld the instruction. 9 The plurality concluded that
the adjective "mere" modified the entire list of nouns, not just "senti-
ment."20 So interpreted, the instruction correctly stated that the jury
should not be swayed by "mere sentiment" or "mere sympathy," among
others. Solan shows that the instruction was in fact quite ambiguous,
and that-as pointed out by the dissent--"mere" could just as well be
interpreted as modifying only "sentiment," thus incorrectly informing ju-
rors that they should not be swayed by "mere sentiment" or by any
sympathy.
21
In fact, these constructions-adjectives followed by multiple
nouns-are virtually always at least somewhat ambiguous. Does "old
men and women" include all women or only old women? If a statute
forbids "large cars or trucks" from entering certain streets, does this re-
fer to all trucks or just large ones? The plurality simply refused to ac-
knowledge this ambiguity, which would probably have required
awarding Brown a new penalty phase trial.22
14. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 5 Wis. L. RE,.
1179 (1990); M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 373 (1985).
15. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 55-59 (1993).
16. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
17. Id. at 539.
18. Id at 542.
19. Id at 543.
20. Id. at 549.
21. SOLAN, supra note 15, at 58-59; see Brown, 479 U.S. at 549 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("A juror could logically conclude that 'mere' modified only 'sentiment' ....").
22. The decision raises questions about whether other factors may have played a role in
this decision. As Lawrence Solan observed, the present Supreme Court, and particularly Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the author of the plurality opinion in Brown, are strong supporters of the
death penalty and generally resist efforts by federal courts to overturn state death penalty
decisions. SOLAN, supra note 15, at 59-61.
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B. When Do Acts Communicate?
Aside from interpreting statutes and constitutions, judges often ad-
dress even more basic linguistic questions. For example, the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the freedom of
speech. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment protects criminal defendants
from being compelled to be witness against themselves. Both of these
provisions require courts to decide when people engage in speech, or
more generally, when they communicate. Only activities that communi-
cate some message, and are thus functionally equivalent to speaking,
come within the scope of the freedom of speech. Thus, a person may
engage in "speech" by publicly burning an American flag2 3 or by wearing
a black armband to protest the Vietnam War.24 By contrast, recreational
dancing has been held not to be "speech."2 Similarly, sunbathing au
naturel, even if done to communicate opposition to antinudity laws, does
not qualify for First Amendment protection.26
The Fifth Amendment raises similar issues. As relevant here, it re-
lates to criminal defendants being called as witnesses and thus being
compelled to testify against themselves. Essentially, the Fifth Amend-
ment protects defendants from being forced to communicate information
that can be used against them in a criminal proceeding. 27 The question
that arises is whether compelling suspects to give blood samples forces
them to communicate or "testify" against themselves, because their
blood sample may be used as evidence against them. 28 The Supreme
Court held in Schmerber v. California 29 that providing blood samples is
not equivalent to communicating "I am drunk." Additionally, it ob-
served that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination extended
only to being compelled to literally testify against oneself, or to provide
the state with "evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.""0
Likewise, the Court has held that the acts of speaking certain words
aloud to allow for voice identification or providing a handwriting sample
are not testimonial.3 '
23. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
24. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969).
25. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989).
26. South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 609 (1lth Cir. 1984) (holding
that nude sunbathing to challenge public indecency law was not expressive conduct).
27. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
28. E.g., id.
29. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
30. Id. at 761.
31. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967) (handwriting exemplar); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967) (voice sample).
November 1993]
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At first it seems quite odd that articulating or writing certain words
is not considered communicative. Yet, I believe, the Court has intui-
tively applied linguistic principles; those principles can justify not only
these Fifth Amendment cases, but also some of the Court's free speech
jurisprudence. A well-known philosopher of language, H.P. Grice, sug-
gests that acts or natural phenomena can have two types of meaning-
natural and nonnatural.32 Smoke, for instance, means that there is fire
somewhere. This meaning is natural: The viewer reaches a conclusion
by way of inference or some other mental process based on perception of,
and knowledge about, the physical world. On the other hand, smoke
signals have nonnatural meaning, since the actor intends to send a
message. Roughly speaking, natural meaning refers to drawing infer-
ences from physical perception; when we observe smoke, we can infer
that there is a fire nearby. On the other hand, nonnatural meaning refers
to instances where a person intends to communicate a message, as when
someone sends smoke signals or tells us something.
In the area of forced confessions, providing a blood sample is hardly
a means of communicating that "I am drunk." Consider, for example, a
patient giving a blood sample to a doctor to determine blood type. By
giving blood, the patient does not intend to communicate "I have type 0
blood"; presumably, the patient is not aware of the blood type, and can-
not consciously communicate this unknown fact. Rather, the blood is
simply evidence from which the doctor makes a determination. The
same is true when someone suspected of being intoxicated is forced to
give blood to authorities. The accused simply provides physical evi-
dence, from which certain inferences can be drawn. The doctor or tech-
nician, who knows the blood alcohol content, communicates this to the
jury.
33
Providing a voice sample by reading certain words, which enables
the victim of a crime or a witness to identify the perpetrator, is a more
difficult case than that of providing a blood sample. Speaking is obvi-
ously communication par excellence. But while speaking communicates,
it also allows for certain inferences. For example, we can often tell gen-
der, emotional state, or national origin from a person's voice. For exam-
ple, if people speak with a German accent, we can infer that they
probably came from Germany. Normally, however, speakers do not in-
tend to communicate their national origin by speaking. Indeed, after
32. H.P. Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REV. 377, 377-79 (1957).
33. For a somewhat different linguistic analysis of this problem, see SOLAN, supra note 15,
at 157-63 (suggesting that act of giving blood could be both communicative and self-damaging
admission).
[Vol. 27:269
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years in the United States, they may be annoyed that listeners can still
hear an accent. This is confirmed by a linguistic test. To say, "By speak-
ing with an accent, they told me they are German" sounds rather odd to
me. It is far more natural to say "I can tell they are German from their
accent." The first sentence describes obtaining information from inten-
tional communication. The sentence sounds odd because it is unusual to
view speaking with a German accent as a way to communicate to some-
one that you are German. The second sentence describes obtaining infor-
mation by inference, and in this context it sounds completely natural.
Now compare the following sentences, each spoken by the victim on
the witness stand after hearing the defendant repeat certain words:
(1) By saying "Your money or your life" the defendant told me he
was the robber.
(2) I could tell the defendant was the robber from how he said
"Your money or your life." As with the German accent example, the
second hypothetical response sounds far more natural. The reason,
again, is that by saying "Your money or your life," the defendant does
not intentionally communicate that he committed the crime. Rather, the
defendant merely provides evidence from which the victim can make this
determination.
More difficult yet is when the accused is forced to provide docu-
ments that contain incriminating information. If I wrote you a note with
the words "Meet me after school" and handed it to you, I have obviously
communicated that we should meet. Now suppose that the teacher in-
tercepts the note. Have I told the teacher to meet me? Obviously not.
More plausibly, I have told or informed the teacher that I have asked you
to meet me. Yet even this seems odd, because I did not intend to com-
municate with the teacher; the teacher merely infers the message from an
intercepted note. One might argue that this example involves uninten-
tional communication, as Larry Solan has suggested to me in personal
communication. While this may be true, the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does not extend to such unintended communi-
cation. Otherwise, no paper written by a defendant could ever come into
evidence because all would constitute unintentional communication. In-
terestingly, however, my act of giving the teacher the note in response to
her demand ("Give me the note you wrote") does communicate to her
that I wrote the note. In contrast, if the teacher searched my desk and
found it, I have communicated nothing to her about its authorship.
It is clear, therefore, that if you intercepted and read a document
that I wrote to someone else, I have not communicated with you because
I never intended to tell you anything. On the other hand, the act of
November 1993]
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giving you a document may mean something, at least if it was in response
to a specific request or demand. Suppose, for example, that it is illegal to
note a job applicant's race, religion, or creed on any documents relating
to that applicant. Suppose that I was an employer under investigation
and the state asked me to surrender all of my employee files that violate
the act. By giving the state two files, I have essentially told the state that
these are my employee fies and that I believe they may violate the act.
If, on the other hand, the state asked for all employee records and I gave
it a hundred file boxes of information, I have communicated at most that
these are my employee records and perhaps that they constitute all such
records, but nothing more. The state must determine whether I have
violated the law.
To a large extent, the Supreme Court's decisions conform to these
linguistic judgments. In United States v. Doe, 34 the Court held that sim-
ply producing business papers is not communicative, even if they might
incriminate the defendant. The Court continued, however, by observing
that "[a]lthough the contents of a document may not be privileged, the
act of producing the document may be.""a If, by producing business
records, the owner would tacitly admit that the papers did exist and were
in his possession, and where production of documents would relieve the
government of the need to authenticate them, the act of producing docu-
ments would be communicative. Without a government grant of use im-
munity, the production would constitute compelled self-incrimination.36
We can also apply this distinction to free speech cases, such as flag
burning. Suppose that we see someone burn an American flag in the
back yard. We might be able to draw certain inferences from this action.
For example, perhaps the flag is old and should be disposed of. We
might also infer that the flag burner is a relatively patriotic person who
knows how to properly dispose of an old flag. We can infer this because
we know that burning is the preferred method of disposing of worn flags.
Critically, the flag burner is not communicating to observers that the flag
is old, or that the flag burner knows what to do with an old flag; we
simply draw these conclusions from the flag burner's actions. On the
other hand, if the flag burner burns the American flag in front of the
house, on the day that the United States announces that it will engage in
a highly controversial military action, and she knows that many neigh-
bors will be around to watch, it is far more likely that the flag burner
intends to communicate opposition to the military action. Communica-
34. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
35. Id. at 612.
36. Id. at 615-17.
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tion is even more likely when the flag burning occurs in front of a govern-
ment building, as in Texas v. Johnson.37
C. The Meaning of "'Interrogation"
In Rhode Island v. Innis,38 a defendant was suspected of killing a
taxicab driver with a shotgun. Once arrested, the police read him the
customary Miranda warning.3 9 The defendant consequently asked to
speak to an attorney.' The police then placed the defendant in a vehicle
to be taken to the police station.41 Under the Miranda decision, once a
suspect in custody asks to speak with a lawyer, all interrogation must
cease until a lawyer is present.42 Thus, the officers in Innis could not
question the defendant during the drive to the station. Importantly, the
police had not yet found the murder weapon, which would doubtless pro-
vide important evidence against the accused.' While en route to the
station, one of the accompanying officers mentioned that there were a lot
of disabled children in the area, and said, "God forbid one of them might
find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves."4" The de-
fendant, expressing concern about the children, then showed the officers
where the gun was located."6
The issue before the Supreme Court in Innis was whether the of-
ficers had engaged in "interrogation" or "questioning." It would have
been easy enough for the Court to dispose of the case by observing that
the officers asked no questions of the defendant, but merely stated that
they were worried about the schoolchildren. Instead, the Court con-
cluded that Miranda's prohibition against further "questioning" extends
not only to literal questioning, but also to its "functional equivalent."'47
37. I explored the difference between communication and inference as applied to the First
Amendment in Peter M. Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of "Speech,"
1993 Wis. L. REv. (forthcoming Dec. 1993).
38. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
39. Id. at 294.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
43. Innis, 446 U.S. at 294.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 294-95 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 295.
47. Id. at 300-01. The Court defined the functional equivalent of questioning as "any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect." Id. at 301 (citation omitted).
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The.Court ultimately held that the officers did not, under this definition,
engage in questioning."
The Court correctly recognized that speech acts are often accom-
plished by indirect means, although one might dispute its ultimate con-
clusion. Consider the following sentence, said by a burglar with a gun to
the occupant of a house: "I will kill your child unless you tell me where
your money is." Obviously, this is not just a statement about what may
happen in the future. Implicit in the threat is a command to provide
information ("Tell me where the money is") or at least a question
("Where is the money?").
Now compare this with what the police in Innis essentially told the
suspect: "A disabled child may die unless you tell us where the shotgun
is." While not a threat to the defendant, the sentence conveyed that
something very bad might happen unless he provided the information. It
clearly functioned as a request for information, and was therefore the
"functional equivalent" of a question.4 9
D. Consensual Searches
Another instance in which the Supreme Court analyzed the lan-
guage of the police occurred in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.Y° There, the
defendant challenged the constitutionality of a search of a car trunk in
which police found incriminating evidence of the crime of possessing a
check with intent to defraud." The police had stopped the car in which
the defendant was riding because of minor vehicle code violations.52
Since the officers had neither a warrant nor other grounds to search the
car, a search would have been constitutional only if the defendant or
another occupant had voluntarily consented to it. 3 After rummaging
through the car itself, the officer asked the occupants: "Does the trunk
open?"5" One of the occupants said "yes," got the keys, and opened the
trunk.
55
48. Id. at 302.
49. Should there be any remaining doubt, consider the following. A mad scientist has
developed a small but lethal bomb that can only be deactivated with a secret code. He plans to
test it in an isolated barn and places it there. Unfortunately, a small child becomes trapped in
the barn. If the child plays with the bomb, there is a danger that it may explode. People now
come to the scientist and say: "The child may die unless you tell us what the secret code is."
Surely they are asking for the secret code!
50. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
51. Id. at 219-20.
52. Id. at 220.
53. Id. at 219.
54. Id. at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id.
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Literally, the officer simply inquired whether the trunk was capable
of being opened. The occupant's response-to actually open the trunk-
indicates that he understood the officer's question as more of a request or
command to open the trunk. This comports with linguistic research on
indirect requests or demands. For example, asking a fellow diner, "Can
you pass the salt?" is not merely a question regarding the diner's capabil-
ity to pass the salt, but a request or command to do so. 6 If the addressee
says "yes" but does nothing, she has acted inappropriately, or at best
made a joke by playing on the literal meaning of the words. A similar
historical example is the words attributed to King Henry II regarding his
enemy, Thomas Becket. King Henry said to his knights: "Will no one
rid me of this turbulent priest?" Not long later, four of Henry's knights
assassinated Becket. 7 "Does the trunk open?" is therefore not simply a
question about the capabilities of the trunk, but is at least a request to
open the trunk, or a command to do so.
Whether the utterance is a request or is instead a command is criti-
cal to the voluntariness of the consent, and thus to the constitutionality
of the search. Where a uniformed police officer commands someone to
open a car trunk, any "consent" can hardly be termed voluntary because
the person who consents will assume that the officer has the authority to
ensure compliance and there is no choice in the matter. 8 Following the
orders of a uniformed and armed officer ("Pull over" or "Place your
hands on the car") is never truly voluntary.
Whether a question like "Does the trunk open?" or "May I look in
the trunk?" is merely a request that can be refused or a command that
must be obeyed depends not so much on the language used, but on the
power relationship between the speaker and addressee. If an ordinary
citizen, taking a tour of the White House, asks a guard standing in front
of the door to the Oval Office, "May I enter this room?" it is simply a
request. If the President asks, he is ordering the guard to step aside. 9
Likewise, suppose that a police officer pulls over a car and asks the
driver, "May I see your license?" "No" is simply not an appropriate
56. See John R. Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, in PRAGMATICS: A READER 265, 265
(Steven Davis ed., 1991).
57. THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 34 (1989).
58. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (holding that consent was
not voluntary where officers appeared at defendant's residence and falsely claimed to have
warrant).
59. John Searle provides a similar example. "If the general asks the private to clean up the
room, that is in all likelihood a command or an order. If the private asks the general to clean
up the room, that is likely to be a suggestion or proposal or request but not an order or
command." John R. Searle, A Classification of lllocutionary Acts, 5 LANGUAGE SOC'Y 1, 5
(1976).
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response. We know that the officer has the right to see our license, has
the power to enforce this right, and that refusing to show our license
would only get us into worse trouble, or at least greatly inconvenience us.
The officer's polite request is really nothing less than a command.'
We now return to the plight of Mr. Bustamonte. While the facts do
not directly say so, it seems a reasonable assumption that he and his
friends, all apparently Chicano and driving a borrowed car,6 ' were not
particularly high on the socioeconomic ladder, nor particularly well edu-
cated. Most likely, they were not particularly aware of their constitu-
tional right to be free of unreasonable searches. Would someone engaged
in activities of questionable legality consent to any type of police search?
In any event, with three armed police officers on the scene, the lights
on their squad cars flashing, Bustamonte and his friends may well have
concluded that even if they might have had the right to refuse access to
the car trunk, it would have been unwise to do so. Like the speeder who
says nothing, but simply hands the officer his driver's license when the
officers asks if he or she "may see" it, Mr. Bustamonte and his friends
simply opened the trunk when the officer requested to look inside.
When someone in a position of power and authority makes what is
literally a request to a subordinate, and the person in power has the right
to command the other, the request will be interpreted as a command. It
is phrased in the language of requesting permission in order to express
politeness, by giving a superficial choice to the addressee. In fact the
power relationships dictate that when the police make a "request," and
they could apparently compel the suspect to carry out the request, the
suspect will view the request as a command.
Applying this principle to the Bustamonte case, only if Mr. Bus-
tamonte and his friends were aware that the police had no authority to
order them to open the trunk could the "request" to look inside be inter-
preted as an actual request that could be refused with no negative conse-
quences. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected requiring such
awareness in Bustamonte, suggesting that although knowledge of the
right to refuse consent was a factor to consider in deciding whether con-
sent was voluntary, it was not determinative.62 Requiring proof that the
60. Consider some other types of indirect commands (at least, in the right context). None
of these are literally imperatives, although all could be phrased as such: "You are standing on
my foot" (Get off my foot!); "I would like you to go now" (Go now!); "Officers will henceforth
wear ties at dinner" (Officers, wear ties at dinner!); "Would you mind not making so much
noise?" (Be quiet!); "How many times have I told you not to eat with your fingers?" (Don't eat
with your fingers!). These examples are from Searle, supra note 56, at 268-69.
61. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 220.
62. Id. at 226.
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suspects knew their right to refuse would allow them to frustrate the use
of the evidence at trial by failing to testify that they were aware of this
right.
63
The Court also rejected the obvious solution to the problem-hav-
ing police advise suspects of their right to refusefr4 The Court declined
this solution because "it would be thoroughly impractical to impose on
the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warn-
ing."' 65 In actuality, simply adding "You have the right to say no" to any
search request would be quite effective in advising suspects of their
rights, and does not seem particularly burdensome.
As a linguistic matter, the notion that Mr. Bustamonte and his
friends freely consented to the search is highly questionable. The real
animus behind the decision becomes apparent in the Court's observation
that "[c]onsent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques
of law enforcement agencies '" 66 and its acknowledgement of the "legiti-
mate need for such searches."'67 Thus, the Court's concern seems to be
that advising suspects of their constitutional right to refuse will en-
courage them to exercise that right, thus leading to fewer criminals being
apprehended.68 While apprehending criminals is certainly a laudable
goal, one wonders whether it might not be attainable without manipulat-
ing the meaning of voluntary consent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judges often engage in various types of linguistic analysis. The
United States Supreme Court, for example, has exhibited both surprising
linguistic acumen and, on the other hand, woeful disregard for how lan-
guage operates in real life situations. Of course, there is not always a
single correct linguistic analysis of legislative texts or conspiratorial con-
versations. Additionally, factors other than language are often relevant
in determining the meaning of legal language; these factors are particu-
larly relevant when the text is incomplete or ambiguous. But when inter-
preting a text, be it statutory or conversational, a careful linguistic
analysis should always be the point of departure.
63. Id. at 230.
64. Id. at 231.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 231-32.
67. Id. at 227-28.
68. Note, incidentally, that while liberal judges have often been accused of engaging in
"result-oriented" jurisprudence, this analysis reveals that moderate and conservative judges
are likewise capable of doing so.
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